The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt
"Coercive imprisonment" is a sanction which courts may use to
enforce compliance with orders and decrees that constitute a final
adjudication between parties' and, in the fact-finding process, to obtain
information from unwilling witnesses. 2 Upon noncompliance with an
order, the party for whose benefit it was issued may institute a proceeding to imprison the opposing party until compliance is obtained.
Questions of fact must be determined at this proceeding, yet the recalcitrant party is afforded no criminal safeguards. It is the thesis of this
comment that in many of its current applications coercive imprisonment is undesirable and, because it involves imprisonment without
criminal safeguards, in some situations unconstitutional as well.
Coercive imprisonment today is viewed as one of the sanctions
available to a court of general jurisdiction through its "contempt
power." 3 The fundamental dichotomy is between criminal and civil
1 Coercive imprisonment is used recurrently in certain factual situations. For example,
it is used to ensure compliance with alimony decrees. See, e.g., Harkins v. Harkins, 127
N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 1964); Hurd v. Hurd, 63 Minn. 443, 65 N.W. 728 (1896); Smiley v. Smiley,
99 Wash. 577, 169 Pac. 962 (1918). In bankruptcy, it may be used to enforce orders to turn
over assets to the trustee. See, e.g., Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948); Oriel v. Russell, 278
U.S. 358 (1929). Coercive imprisonment is often used to gain compliance with injunctions.
See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (N.D. I1. 1894). However, due
to fears of conflict with prohibitions against imprisonment for debt, coercive imprisonment
is seldom used to enforce ordinary damage actions.
2 It is used to enforce orders to appear and testify. See, e.g., McCrone v. United States,
307 U.S. 61 (1939); Fox v. Capitol Co., 299 U.S. 105 (1936). Such procedure has seen
increasing application in aiding grand jury investigations. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER,
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2308. See also account of imprisonment of Momo Giancana,

Chicago Sun-Times, June 2, 1965, p. 3, col. 1; Id., Sept. 17, 1965, p. 28, col. 1. Coercion
may also be used to enforce orders to present books and records. See, e.g., Penfield Co.
v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947).
3 This label is currently applied to an array of sanctions a court may impose to enforce
compliance with its orders and to maintain its dignity. Courts assume that absent legislation they have an inherent power to imprison coercively. See Doyle v. London Guar. &
Acc. Co., 204 U.S. 599 (1907); In re Lee, 170 Md. 43, 183 At. 560 (1936); State ex rel. Beck
v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 174 Neb. 172, 116 N.W.2d 281 (1962); Upper Lakes Shipping,
Ltd. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1963). An historical argument
favoring this position is that the English Chancellor from as early as the time of
Richard III could imprison until his orders were complied with. The argument can also
be made that coercive imprisonment is necessary in order to maintain the independence of
the judiciary; that is, a court which could not enforce its own orders would be powerless
and at the mercy of the other branches of government. See State ex rel. Beck v. Frontier
Airlines, Inc., supra. Contempt, however, has also been a matter for legislation. See, e.g.,
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contempt: 4 while a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding has
almost all the safeguards of a normal criminal defendant5 except the
right to indictment and trial by jury,6 the civil contemnor has only the
rights of any civil litigant.7 The civil contemnor is entitled neither to a
the general federal contempt statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1958) (power of court); 18 U.S.C.
§ 402 (1958) (contempts constituting crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1958) (jury trial of
criminal contempts); 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1958) (jury trial for contempt in labor dispute
cases). These statutes, like many state statutes, are unclear as to whether they apply
solely to criminal contempt or whether they are also applicable to civil contempt.
The better view, however, is that limitations which these statutes place on the contempt power are inapplicable to coercive imprisonment. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United
States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924); Alexander v. United
States, 173 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1949) (rules of criminal procedure inapplicable); In re Sixth
& Wis. Tower, Inc., 108 F.2d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1939) (Evans, J. concurring); Odell v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1937). See also 54 HIAv. L. REv. 137
(1940). There have been scattered statements to the contrary. See, e.g., Penfield Co. v.
SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947) (which assumed only arguendo that the statute was applicable);
Estes v. Potter, 183 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. Montgomery, 155 F. Supp.
633 (D. Mont. 1957). However, the fact that since the 1952 revision of titles 28 and 18, all
general contempt statutes have appeared in title 18--"Crimes and Criminal Procedure"-reinforces the view that the provisions are applicable only to criminal contempt.
4 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); McCann v. New York
Stock Exch., 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935). As to the standards that are used to distinguish
civil from criminal contempt actions, see Wright, Byrne, Haach, Wetbrook & Wheat, Civil
and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167 (1955); Beale, Contempt of
Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HaRv. L. Rav. 161 (1908); Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLuM. L. Rxv. 780 (1943); Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83 (1947).
5 The criminal contemnor may be pardoned. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925);
In re Mullee, 17 Fed. Cas. 968 (No. 9911) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869). The state cannot appeal
from an acquittal. United States ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Bittner, 11
F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1926); Plumb v. Plumb, 372 S.W.2d 771 (Tenn. App. 1962). But see,
Welborn v. Mize, 107 Ga. App. 427, 130 S.E.2d 623 (1963). The defendant may refuse to
testify. Hammond Lumber Co. v. Sailors' Union, 167 Fed. 809 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1909); cf.
Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924);
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911). But see, Merchants'
Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 Fed. 20 (8th Cir. 1912). The defendant is presumed to be innocent. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911);
Cliett v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Balaban, 26 F. Supp.
491 (N.D. Il. 1939). His guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); Cliett v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565
(5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Pollack, 201 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
6 The absence of a right to trial by jury in criminal contempt cases has been subjected to increasingly critical scrutiny. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 724
(1964) (Black, J., dissenting); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Ballantyne v. United States, 237 F.2d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 1956) (Cameron, J.,
dissenting in part); Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312 (1st Cir. 1954). The dictum in
United States v. Barnett, supra, at 694-95 n.12, suggests that the Court will no longer
permit the imposition of' long term criminal contempt sentences without trial by jury.
See generally Tefft, United States v. Barnett: "'Twas a Famous Victory", 1964 Sup. CT.
REV. 123.
7 Not even Mr. Justice Black, the most consistent opponent of contemporary criminal
contempt practices, questions "the power of courts to impose conditional imprisonment
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trial by jurys nor to a fifth amendment right to refuse to testify,9 and

he is not favored by a presumption of innocence. 10 The "burden of
proof lies somewhere between the criminal 'reasonable doubt' and the
civil 'fair preponderance' burden";" it is heavy, but less than that required for criminal conviction. Furthermore, in many jurisdictions the
12
burden of proving an affirmative defense is on the defendant.
In spite of the greater procedural protection afforded the criminal
contemnor, coercive imprisonment is more harsh in its post-trial treatment of the defendant than is a criminal proceeding. Because confinement may continue until compliance, 3 the civil contemnor's openended sentence theoretically can continue indefinitely and with no
opportunity for executive clemency.14 In addition, there is danger of
double jeopardy in a nontechnical sense: although no appeal may be
taken from the acquittal of a criminal defendant, a decision favorable to
an alleged contemnor in a coercive imprisonment proceeding is appealable. 15 Such radical differences in the rights of the defendant depending
on the classification of the proceeding can only be justified by correfor the purpose of compelling a person to obey a valid order." Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). But see GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER
168-74 (1963). The civil contemnor of course is entitled to those fourteenth amendment
safeguards applicable to all judicial proceedings. For example, the contemnor has a due
process right to notice and an opportunity to present a defense. Parker v. United States,
153 F.2d 66 (Ist Cir. 1946); Boyd v. Glucklich, 116 Fed. 131 (8th Cir. 1902); Philippe v.
Window Glass Cutters League, 99 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Ark. 1951); In the Matter of Von
Gerzabek, 58 Cal. App. 230, 208 Pac. 318 (1922).
8 United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (by implication); Odell v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1937).
9 Merchants' Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 Fed. 20 (8th Cir. 1912); American
Pastry Prods. Corp. v. United Prods. Corp., 39 F.2d 181 (D. Mass. 1930).
10 Coca-Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
11 In the Matter of Dresden, 177 F. Supp. 339, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The burden has been
described as being met by "clear and convincing evidence," Fox v. Capitol Co., 96 F.2d 684,
686 (3d Cir. 1938), or by "something more than a bare preponderance," Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 77, 79 (8th Cir. 1943). But see Quezada v. Superior Court,
171 Cal. App. 2d 528, 340 P.2d 1018 (1959), where proof beyond a reasonable doubt was
required of a complainant in a civil contempt proceeding.
12 See, e.g., Cutting v. Van Fleet, 252 Fed. 100 (9th Cir. 1918); Dishinger v. Bon Air
Catering, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 557, 84 N.E.2d 562 (1949); State ex rel. City of Minneapolis
v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 154 Minn. 401, 191 N.W. 1004 (1923); Drake v. National Bank
of Commerce, 168 Va. 230, 190 S.E. 302 (1937). This is especially true in the alimony situation where the majority of states place the burden on the contemnor to prove the
affirmative defense of inability to perform. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 607 (1957), for a listing
of cases.
18 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Parker v. United States,
153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946).
14 In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448 (8th Cir. 1902); Miller v. Rivers, 31 F. Supp. 540 (M.D. Ga.
1940).
15 Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932).
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sponding differences in the "character and purpose" of the proceed16
ings.
Criminal contempt is punitive. 17 By punishing acts of disrespect and
disobedience, criminal contempt vindicates the court's honor and thus
protects "the public interest in the effective functioning of the judicial
system."' 8 On the other hand, civil contempt preceedings do not seek
to punish the defendant, but rather to benefit the complainant:' 9 the
remedial measures applied are either compensatory or coercive; 20 compensatory measures benefit the complainant directly, 21 while coercive
10 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911); accord, Nye v.
United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941); McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939); Bessette
v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904); MacNeil v. United States, 236 F.2d 149 (Ist
Cir. 1956). Unfortunately courts often place reliance on other indicia as aids in classification and thus lose sight of the reason for classification. Among these indicia are: (1) Who
is the complainant? If he is a private party, it is an indication that the proceeding is
civil. See Raymor Ballroom Co. v. Buck, 110 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1940). If the complainant is
the government, it is an indication that the proceeding is criminal. See United States
ex tel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Bittner, 11 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1926). However,
the United States may be a party to a civil contempt proceeding when the purpose of the
proceeding is to coerce performance. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947);
McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939). (2) How is the proceeding styled? Civil contempt proceedings are ancillary to the main cause of action and are captioned in that
cause, while a separate caption is used in the criminal proceeding. See In re Door, 195
F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1952). (3) What is the nature of the court's order? Proceedings to
coerce compliance with a mandatory injunction are civil, while punishment for violation
of a restraining order is criminal.
Courts should be particularly careful to avoid the circularity of deeming a proceeding
civil because a right that a defendant deserves in a criminal proceeding has been denied.
Rather, the purpose of the contempt proceeding must be determined, then the suitability
of the methods used can be evaluated.
17 See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42-43 (1941); In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 458
(8th Cir. 1902).
18 Juneau Spruce Corp. v. International Longshoremen's Union, 131 F. Supp. 866, 871
(D. Hawaii 1955).
19 See United States v. UMW 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418 (1911); MacNeil v. United States, 236 F.2d 149 (lst Cir. 1956); Parker v.
United States, 126 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir. 1942).
20 This distinction was drawn in United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947);
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448-49 (1911).
21 The most common form of compensatory relief is the imposition of a "fine payable
to an aggrieved litigant as compensation for special damages he may have sustained
by reason of the contumacious conduct of the offender." Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d
370, 380 (1st Cir. 1942). A litigant is usually considered entitled to demand remedial
relief. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947); Yanish v. Barber, 232 F.2d 939 (9th Cir.
1956); cf. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (Ist Cir. 1946). However, some courts in the
absence of statutory authority refuse to allow compensatory contempt awards. See Kasparek
v. May, 174 Neb. 732, 119 N.V.2d 512 (1963); Edrington v. Pridham, 65 Tex. 612 (1886);
cf. State ex rel. Lanning v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348, 4 N.W. 390 (1880). States which do not
provide statutory authority fear that the granting of compensatory fines for contempt
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measures influence the defendant to act in a way that will ultimately
benefit the moving party.
Although these categories appear to be distinct, the lines separating
criminal from civil contempt and compensatory from coercive civil
proceedings are far from clear. Courts frequently misuse the terms, such
as when they speak of punishment for remedial purposes, 22 and thus
engender confusion. Since different categories of contempt sanctions
may be employed concurrently in many factual situations, there is
further opportunity for confusion. A contempt proceeding may have
both criminal and civil elements, 23 and noncompliance with a compensatory measure may provoke coercive ones. 24 Furthermore, a single
sanction may fulfill more than one purpose; a per diem fine payable
to a complainant is both compensatory and coercive, since it both
reimburses the complainant and puts pressure on the defendant to
comply. Moreover, even coercive measures ostensibly imposed solely for
the benefit of the complainant also serve to uphold the dignity of the
court by indicating that orders will be enforced. But this incidental effect
is insufficient to require the classification of all coercive imprisonment
as punitive, just as all tort actions are not punitive simply because they
too deter certain forms of antisocial behavior. Similarly, criminal contempt has an implicit civil effect because fear of punishment may coerce
25
the action desired by a particular complainant.
However, the difficulty and inexactitude of classification does not
diminish its necessity. Classification is a shorthand manner of determining what procedures and sanctions are desirable and constitutionally permissible. Thus, there is no objection to the commingling of a
criminal contempt proceeding with one for civil contempt if the defendant is not thereby deprived of rights he would have enjoyed in a
separate criminal contempt proceeding. 26 But the converse is not true;
punitive action by the government should never be treated as civil,
would serve as a substitute for damage actions, while allowing avoidance of a jury trial
at the plaintiff's discretion.
22 See United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1951); In re Sixth & Wis. Tower, Inc.,
108 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1939); Coca-Cola Co. v. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
Particularly troublesome in this respect are statutes which refer to civil contempt by such
phrases as "to punish as for contempt." See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-8 (1953).
23 See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); In re Swan, 150 U.S. 637 (1893).
24 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Parker v. United States,
126 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir. 1942); Raymor Ballroom Co. v. Buck, 110 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1940);
Trotcky v. Van Sickle, 227 Ind. 441, 85 N.E.2d 638 (1949).
25 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 443 (1911).
26 See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). A defendant -might prefer for the
proceeding to be categorized as civil. The time for appeal, for example, might be greater
in a civil than in a criminal case.
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thereby depriving the defendant of the protection of criminal procedure, even if the action has a remedial aspect.27
Although the differences in treatment of the defendant in civil and
criminal contempt have frequently been noted, the essential question
is rarely asked or satisfactorily answered: Why should the civil contemnor not be entitled to the same rights as the criminal contempt
defendant? The usual answer to this question is that civil contemnors do
not need the safeguards of criminal procedure because they "carry the
keys of their prison in their own pocket. '28 However, they may not
actually have the keys in their pocket. Both compliance and inability
to comply are complete defenses to coercive imprisonment proceedings.2 9 The contemnor may have already complied or be incapable of
doing so, yet the determination of these facts is made without criminal
safeguards even though imprisonment hinges on the outcome of that
determination.
The better justification for the differing rights of the civil and the
criminal contempt defendants rests on the function of civil contempt
vis-4-vis the complaining party. Since no private party can insist that a
criminal contempt citation issue, 0 the safeguards there granted the
defendant do not conflict with the rights of any other party. But granting additional safeguards to the defendant in a civil contempt proceeding is directly opposed to the interests of the complainant, to whom the
defendant owes a duty by reason of a prior judicial decree. Even so,
allowing an individual to be imprisoned without traditional criminal
safeguards seems inconsistent with modem notions of individual freedom. Resolution of this tension requires a balancing of the interests
of the two parties to the proceeding.
Once a judgment on the merits has been entered, both parties have
already had their day in court, and coercive imprisonment is simply
used to enforce compliance with that judgment. In such cases, to grant
the recalcitrant defendant in the contempt proceeding all the rights of a
criminal defendant would place an unfair burden on the plaintiff's
right to have his judgment enforced. An important, and perhaps the
See notes 36-41 infra and accompanying text.
In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). Judge Sanborn's rationalization has
since become a staple in the rhetoric of civil contempt.
29 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948); United States ex rel. Emanuel v. Jaeger, 117
F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1941); United States ex rel. Paleais v. Moore, 294 Fed. 852 (2d Cir. 1923).
80 See McCann v. New York Stock Exch., 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935); McCauley v. First
Trust 8, Say. Bank, 276 Fed. 117 (7th Cir. 1921); State ex rel. Reichert v. Youngblood,
225 Ind. 129, 73 N.E.2d 174 (1947). The State of Georgia stands alone in allowing private
individuals to initiate criminal contempt proceedings. See Aired v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga.
371, 54 S.E.2d 240 (1949).
27

28
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only, means of enforcement would be eliminated if the complainant
were unable to meet the criminal burden of proof.
It even seems peculiar that a heavier burden of proof must be
carried against the civil contemnor than against the ordinary civil
defendant. 31 The explanation would seem to be that burden of proof,
unlike an issue such as right to jury trial, presents a question of varying
degrees and not of simple alternatives. Courts that require the complainant to carry a burden greater than the ordinary fair preponderance standard probably feel that even with such treatment, judgments
can still be enforced effectively.
When coercion is used in the fact-finding process to enforce subpoenas to appear and testify or to present records, a balancing of conflicting
interests is also necessary because the testimony that is to be obtained
may have bearing on the rights of other parties to the investigation. For
example, if a bankrupt refuses to turn over books to the trustee, interests of a plaintiff-creditor might be infringed. This sort of balancing
process often justifies the remedial imprisonment of uncooperative defendants and witnesses, even though the procedures followed lack the
safeguards deemed necessary in cases of punitive imprisonment. Additional safeguards should be denied the defendant in order to protect
the rights of a complainant.
Despite this policy justification for not granting the civil contemnor
criminal safeguards, arguably the fifth and sixth amendments require
that they be granted. Such arguments have generally been dismissed
with the assertion that, because contempt is sui generis, 32 these amendments are inapplicable. However, since the scope of these amendments
is constantly expanding,3 3 the fact that they have not yet been applied
to coercive imprisonment is insufficient to dispose of the constitutional
argument.
For purposes of discussion, three categories of constitutional rights
must be distinguished. The first category includes those due process
rights, such as the right to an impartial hearing, to which all litigants
are entitled. The second category includes the expressly enumerated
rights secured by the sixth amendment and the fifth amendment provisions dealing with indictment, double jeopardy and self-incrimination. The last category is composed of the rights, such as a presumption
31 See note 11 supra.
32 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co..
194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904); State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 170, 271 N.W. 282,
284 (1937).
33 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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of innocence, that are secured solely by the due process clause and have
34
been applied only to criminal defendants.
There is no question that the civil contemnor, like any civil litigant,
is entitled to the first group of rights.35 However, in spite of the widening scope of the fifth and sixth amendments, the second category of
rights would seem inapplicable to coercive imprisonment proceedings
which, in fact, are not punitive.3 6 The sixth amendment deals only
with "criminal prosecutions." Except for the "due process" and "just
compensation" clauses, the language of the fifth amendment limits its
application to a "criminal case," "offense," and "capital or otherwise
infamous crime." Although these terms are not coextensive, 37 they all
limit the application of the amendments to situations where a disability
is imposed for "the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc." 38 The imposition on a defendant of
a disability is not in itself sufficient to require the application of the
safeguards guaranteed by these amendments. Although a defendant is
entitled to those guarantees when a disability is being imposed for
punitive purposes,3 9 if the disability is imposed only to "accomplish
some other legitimate governmental purpose" 40 no criminal safeguards
need be granted. 41 When coercive imprisonment is applied only to
enforce rights due others and is the sole means of enforcing those
rights, it is being used for purely nonpunitive purposes.
An apt analogy may be drawn to the relationship between a tort
34 These rights are hereinafter referred to as "criminal due process rights." By this
phrase is meant only the rights of criminal defendants guaranteed by the due process
clauses of both the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and not rights which are afforded
the criminal defendant in state courts simply by fourteenth amendment incorporation of
other, specific constitutional rights. An example of the latter is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 35 (1963), where the sixth amendment right to counsel was incorporated into
fourteenth amendment due process.
35 He has a due process right to notice and an opportunity to present a defense; Parker
v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946); Boyd v. Glucklich, 116 Fed. 131 (8th Cir. 1902);
Philippe v. Window Glass Cutters League, 99 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Ark. 1951); In the Matter
of Von Gerzabek, 58 Cal. App. 230, 208 Pac. 318 (1922).
36 See text accompanying notes 53-67 infra, for examples of sanctions which are sometimes applied under the name of remedial action, but which in effect are punitive.
37 See Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A
New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 290, 291 n.2 (1964), and
cases cited therein.
38 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
39 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228 (1896).
40 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
41 See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); cf. Johnson v. Wall, 329
F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1964).
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action and a punitive fine imposed by the government. Despite the
fact that it may truly be a hardship for the defendant in a tort action to
pay large compensatory damages, no one would seriously suggest that
this would entitle the defendant to criminal safeguards even though an
action imposing a fine of lesser amount would entitle the defendant
to some of these procedural protections. The mere fact that a contemnor's imprisonment is not quid pro quo the loss to the complainant
is no reason to discard the analogy. Rather, imprisonment to obtain
what is due the complainant is analogous to the process of execution
sale, to which no constitutional objections can be raised. In both, because the defendant is recalcitrant more may be exacted from him than
the plaintiff receives in order to give the plaintiff what he is entitled
to; the yield of an execution sale often fails to equal the price the property would bring in an unhurried, voluntary sale.
Even though an execution sale might harm an individual more than
a short-term confinement, one could argue that because imprisonment
is primarily a criminal sanction, fairness requires that "criminal due
process rights" 42 be granted to the civil contemnor where imprisonment
may result. However, imprisoning a party without such safeguards is
permitted in a number of situations. For example the insane may be
confined, 43 as may those with contagious diseases. 44 State constitutional
provisions which deny bail in capital cases are valid when "proof of
guilt was evident or the presumption thereof was great." 45 In all of

these situations, strong overriding social considerations justify incarceration without the usual "criminal due process rights." Just as the
hardship of imprisonment without a criminal trial may be imposed
upon the insane and the diseased for the protection of society as well as
for their own welfare, when coercive imprisonment is the only effective
method of ensuring a complainant's rights it too serves social ends
which, coupled with its nonpunitive character, render it permissible
even without granting the defendant "criminal due process rights."
Apart from the constitutional argument, when the complainant has
other equally effective but less harsh remedies against recalcitrance,
coercive imprisonment cannot be justified. The deprivation of liberty
See note 34 supra for definition of this term.
43 See Martin v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Mo. 1961); In the Matter of Coates, 9
N.Y.2d 242, 173 N.E.2d 797, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1961); In re Cornell, 111 Vt. 525, 18 A.2d
304 (1941).
44 See People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Il1. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922); In re
Caselli, 62 Mont. 201, 204 Pac. 364 (1922); Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N.Y. 493, 116 N.E. 355
(1917).
45 See In the Matter of Berry, 198 Wash. 317, 319, 88 P.2d 427, 429 (1939); cf. United
States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1949) (Minton, J.).
42
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is an extreme measure and should not be resorted to unless necessary
to protect the complainant's rights. Thus, when a complainant can effectively proceed by ordinary attachment or garnishment proceedings
policy dictates that the coercive remedy should not be available.
Similarly, in the fact-finding process less severe remedies may be applied
against litigants. In the federal courts, for example, pleadings may be
struck or facts may be taken as established against the recalcitrant
party. 46 The utilization of these alternatives should be encouraged 47 by
permitting the defendant to plead them as defenses to coercive imprisonment.4 8 This proposal would not impair the effectiveness of
proceedings to enforce judgments, as coercive imprisonment would still
be available when necessary; however, it would eliminate the possibility
49
of coercive imprisonment being used for purely vindictive purposes.
The proposal is not entirely novel. In New York, it has been held that
the possibility of execution of the judgment is a defense to coercive
imprisonment. 50 The Supreme Court of Michigan has also stated in
dictum that coercive imprisonment cannot be used when "execution,
attachment or garnishment may issue, or there is any other adequate
remedy."51
Although coercive imprisonment should not be used when alternative
remedies are available, if it is used in such a situation it would appear
to be unconstitutional unless the defendant is accorded "criminal due
process rights" at the contempt proceeding. The cases have not yet
reached this result, but, as noted above, the only situations in which
imprisonment has been imposed without such safeguards have involved
strong competing public interests, such as confining the dangerously
insane. Absent such competing interests, for example where alternative
See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
In some cases, because contempt proceedings were available, alternative methods of
enforcement, rather than being encouraged, were only grudgingly allowed. Fisher v.
Medwedeff, 184 Md. 167, 40 A.2d 360 (1944); State ex rel. Place v. Bland, 353 Mo. 639,
183 S.V.2d 878 (1944); Kane v. Smith, 56 Wash. 2d 799, 355 P.2d 827 (1960).
48 This proposal raises ancillary problems. For one thing, since attorney's fees may, at the
judge's discretion, be granted in a civil contempt proceeding to a successful complainant,
Gompers v. Bucks Stove 8: Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 447 (1911) (dictum), a similar provision
should be made where alternative sanctions are employed. For another, in determining
whether the alternative remedy will be equally effective the additional procedural limitations imposed on the complainant by the alternative remedy must be considered.
49 See the humorous opinion of Judge Bonynge in Politano v. Politano, 146 Misc. 792,
262 N.Y. Supp. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1933), regarding the fate of "an ignorant and penniless
Italian" at the hands of a vindictive "waspish woman."
80 Hennig v. Abrahams, 246 App. Div. 621, 282 N.Y. Supp. 970 (1935), aff'd, 270 N.Y.
626, 1 N.E.2d 362 (1936).
51 Burton v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 325 Mich. 159, 165, 37 N.W.2d 899, 902 (1949)
(emphasis added); accord, Carnahan v. Carnahan, 143 Mich. 390, 107 N.W. 73 (1906);
Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R. v. Jennison, 60 Mich, 232, 27 N.W. 6 (1886).
46
47
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remedies are available to a complainant in a coercive imprisonment
proceeding, there seems to be no reason for an exception to the general
notion that imprisonment without "criminal due process rights" is
unconstitutional.
If criminal procedural safeguards are not afforded, it is necessary
to distinguish between permissible imprisonment-that which is truly
coercive-and unjustifiable, or punitive, imprisonment. Imprisonment
cannot be considered coercive unless the contemnor is kept in prison
only until he complies with the relevant court order. 52 However, courts
occasionally impose a term of imprisonment of set duration for civil
contempt. 53 This practice does not serve a coercive function and therefore is unjustified. Once committed, a contemnor would have no incentive to comply with the order. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
recently indicated that it would allow the imposition of a flat six-month
term of imprisonment in the name of civil contempt "to deter the
contemnor from repeating his misconduct." 54 Surely such a sanction
would be punitive, because the contemnor would have no opportunity
to recant and free himself. Its only function would be that of deterrence,
and it should therefore be considered unconstitutional since it is
applied without criminal safeguards. In this connection, no objection
can be raised to the imposition of a determinate sentence if the contemnor is given the right to purge himself of the contempt. In such a
case, if the contemnor retains the same defenses which would have been
available to him had the commitment order been couched in terms of
"confinement until compliance," the court has simply limited the
potential term of imprisonment. To that, the contemnor certainly
cannot object.
Conditional fines are another method of coercion, often consisting
of the imposition of a fine per diem until compliance. 55 The more
common practice, however, is to threaten the imposition of a large fine ,
unless there is compliance by a certain date. 56 If the fine does not
represent the actual damage caused by the contumacy it is not compensatory. 57 Once the date for compliance has passed, exaction of the
See authorities cited note 13 supra.
See, e.g., Doyle v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 204 U.S. 599 (1907); Dahl v. Dali, 210
Minn. 361, 298 N.W. 361 (1941). In Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953),
a ninety day sentence which could be suspended only in its entirety was upheld.
54 Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 8, 125 N.W.2d 324,
328 (1963) (dictum).
55 See, e.g., Department of Health v. Borough of Fort Lee, 108 N.J. Eq. 139, 154 AtI.
319 (Ch. 1931).
56 See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
57 The amount of a compensatory fine must be the actual damages sustained. United
States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Yanish v. Barber, 232 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1956).
52
53
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fine cannot be justified on the basis of coercion; at that point, compliance with the court order-performance by a certain date-cannot be
coerced. This practice is analogous to the imposition of a determinate
jail sentence 58 and, even though the deterrent effect of the threat might
indirectly benefit specific complainants, must be viewed as punitive
rather than coercive and hence unconstitutional absent criminal safeguards.
Coercive imprisonment is remedial, of course, only when the defendant is able to comply.59 As the Supreme Court has said, "to jail one
for contempt for omitting an act he is powerless to perform would make
the proceeding purely punitive, to describe it charitably." 60 This is true
because imprisoning a defendant incapable of performance cannot
possibly cause him to take action to benefit the complainant. Given that
inability to perform is a complete defense, it is necessary to determine
whether placing the burden of proving this issue on the defendant is
justifiable. 01 Even in a standard criminal proceeding, it is constitutionally permissible to place the burden of proving such affirmative defenses
as insanity62 or intoxication 63 on the defendant. The law accomplishes
this result by raising a presumption against the defendant on the issue.
But, in order for such a presumption to satisfy due process, the fact
established must have a "rational connection" with the fact presumed. 64
58 The analogy between a determinate jail sentence and a fine payable unless there
is compliance is noted in Jencks v. Goforth, 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953). However,
the analogy is used to justify a determinate sentence which could be suspended only in its
entirety.
59 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948); United States ex rel. Emanuel v. Jaeger, 117
F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1941) (dictum); United States ex rel. Paleais v. Moore, 294 Fed. 852 (2d
Cir. 1923).
60 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72 (1948).
61 When coercive imprisonment is used to enforce orders to pay money or to turn over
books, ability to perform is usually the central issue. However, when it is used to enforce
injunctions, the factual issue litigated is generally whether there has been compliance, and
not whether the defendant is able to comply. See, e.g., California Artificial Stone Paving
Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885); Electro-Bleaching Gas Co. v. Paradon Eng'r Co., 15
F.2d 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1926).
62 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); cf. Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450
(6th Cir. 1960); Snider v. Smyth, 187 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Va. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Snider
v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961).
63 See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 113 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1953), rev'd
on other grounds, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164,
58 A.2d 433 (1948).
64 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable
Statutory Presumptions, 55 COLUm. L. Rv. 527 (1955). An interesting example of a permissible presumption is seen in the so-called net worth cases. See Comment, 42 MARQ. L.
REv. 91 (1958). The government's theory in these cases is that once there has been a showing that a taxpayer's assets have increased, there exists a presumption that all unexplainable increases are attributable to income. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
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In coercive imprisonment proceedings the original order stands as the
established fact. If contempt is used to enforce a judgment in which the
original proceeding did not consider the question of ability to pay, there
is no "rational connection" between it and the presumption of ability to
pay; consequently, shifting the burden of proof is unjustified.6 5 However, when the order allegedly violated is "predicated on a finding of
ability," 66 such as an alimony order, there has already been an adjudication against the contemnor on that issue, although one not arrived at
pursuant to criminal procedural standards.
Even if the original order is based on a finding of ability, the passage
of time between the original proceeding and the subsequent contempt
proceeding allows the defendant to claim inability at the contempt
proceeding because with the passage of time the "rational connection"
between the original finding and the question of present ability
67

weakens.

A period of imprisonment also lends credence to a contemnor's
assertion of inability to comply. Furthermore, the mere fact that an
imprisoned contemnor remains in jail is evidence that the coercion has
not been effective and is grounds for the inference that the imprisonment may continue to be futile. At some point, further confinement
cannot be justified as an effective manner of assuring the complainant
his rights.
In conclusion it can be said that coercive imprisonment is a powerful
judicial tool for the enforcement of court orders. On occasion it can,
65 It might be suggested that since the defendant has easier access to the evidence he
should bear the burden of proof on the issue of ability. However, the Supreme Court
has held that the "comparative convenience" test is insufficient by itself to justify shifting
the burden of proof in criminal cases. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
66 In the Matter of Carpenter, 36 Cal. App. 2d 274, 278, 97 P.2d 476, 478 (1939).
67 In bankruptcy cases there is often a plea of inability at the contempt proceeding.
Prior to Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948), it had generally been understood that Oriel
v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929), precluded any investigation at the contempt proceeding
dealing with inability to comply except that which positively showed the disposition of
assets deemed to be in the bankrupt's hands at the time of the turnover order. See, e.g.,
In re Luma Camera Service, Inc., 157 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1946), revd sub nom. Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. (1948), and cases collected at 954 n.7. Nineteen years later, in Maggio, the
Supreme Court concluded that Oriel stood only for the proposition that in a contempt proceeding a defendant with a turnover order against him is thereby confronted
by a prima facie case against him "which he can successfully meet only with a showing
of present inability to comply." 33 U.S. at 75 (Emphasis added.) Thus the defendant at
a contempt proceeding can in fact contradict the original order by bringing forth evidence
on the question of present inability. See, e.g., In re Luma Camera Service, Inc., supra;
In re Bar-Craft Dresses, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The Supreme Court has
even stated that merely being in "the shadow of prison gates" may be taken as some indication of inability; as time passes, the presumption of ability to perform lessens. Maggio
v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 72 (1948).
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however, be too powerful. Its utilization without criminal safeguards
can only be justified if its application is limited to situations in which it
is both effective and necessary to guarantee rights due other parties. Its
use as punishment is unjustifiable and may be unconstitutional. Limiting coercive imprisonment to its proper role can and should be accomplished both by legislation 8 and by judicial restraint.
68 Courts sometimes assume that their "inherent" power cannot be restricted by
statute. In Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42
(1924), the Supreme Court hinted that there might be doubts as to the power of Congress
to limit the power of courts by requiring that a jury trial be made available in cases
of civil contempt. This view, however, seems extremely questionable, at least as far as the
federal courts are concerned. See 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.33 [1], at 259-60 (2d
ed. 1951). Power may be withheld from the courts "in the exact degrees and character
which to Congress may seem proper for the public good." Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
236, 245 (1845), quoted in Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943). See Frankfurter &
Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal
Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HAiv. L. REv. 1010 (1924), for the instances
in which Congress has limited the power of the lower courts. In state courts which have
considered the problem, the most common view has been that reasonable legislative
regulation of the contempt power is permissible. Compare In the Matter of Garner, 179
Cal. 409, 177 Pac. 162 (1918), and Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679, 148 S.V. 914 (1912), with
Opinion of the Justices, 86 N.H. 597, 166 At. 640 (1933).

